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[698] D. M. Armstrong, ‘The Causal Theory of the Mind’, Neue Heft f?r Philosophie, no. 11, 1977, 88. [699] Ñì.: N. Block, ‘What is Functionalism?’, N. Block (ed.), Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, V. 1, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1980, 175 – 177. [700] Òàì æå, 177 è äàëåå. [701] D. Lewis, ‘Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50, 1972, 249 – 258. [702] D. Lewis, ‘Mad Pain and Martian Pain’, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, V. 1, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1980, 216 – 222. [703] D. Lewis, ‘Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications’, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, V. 1, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1980, 208 – 209. [704] D. Armstrong, ‘The Nature of Mind’, C. V. Brost (ed.), The Mind/Brain Identity Theory, London, Macmillan, 1970, 67 – 79. [705] Â: H. Putnam, ‘The Nature of Mental States’, W. H. Capitan and D. D. Merrill (eds.), Art, Mind, and Religion, Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967, 37 – 48. [706] Jaegwon Kim, ‘Physicalism and the Multiple Realisability of Mental States’, “Phenomenal Properties, Psychophysical Laws, and the Identity Theory”, Monist 56, no. 2, 1972, 177 – 192. [707] N. Block, ‘Troubles with Functionalism’, C. W. Savage (ed.), Perception and Cognition. Issues in the Foundations of Psychology, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 9, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1978, 261 – 325. [708] S. Shoemaker, ‘Functionalism and Qualia’, Philosophical Studies 27, 1975, 291 – 315. [709] Êðèòèê ìîæåò ñ÷åñòü íå âïîëíå óáåäèòåëüíûì ýòîò ïåðåõîä îò êà÷åñòâåííûõ õàðàêòåðîâ ê êà÷åñòâåííûì ñîñòîÿíèÿì: ïî÷åìó èìåòü îïðåäåëåííûé êà÷åñòâåííûé õàðàêòåð, íàõîäÿñü â òîì èëè èíîì ìåíòàëüíîì ñîñòîÿíèè, äîëæíî îçíà÷àòü íàõîæäåíèå â îïðåäåëåííîì êà÷åñòâåííîì ñîñòîÿíèè? [710] N. Block and J. Fodor, ‘What Psychological States Are Not?’, Philosophical Review 81, no. 2, 1972, 159 – 181. [711] N. Block, ‘Troubles with Functionalism’, C. W. Savage (ed.), Perception and Cognition. Issues in the Foundations of Psychology, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 9, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1978, 261 – 325. [712] Ñì.: J. Fodor, The Language of Thought, N. Y. Crowell, 1975, îñîáåííî: Ch. 2. [713] M. Tye, ‘A Representational Theory of Pains and their Phenomenal Character’, J. Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 9, Atascadero: Ridgeview Publishing Co., 1990, 236. — 803 —
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